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Abstract
How do firms’ avoidance and evasion opportunities affect market prices? We inves-
tigate the causal link between tax-evasion opportunities and prices in a situation
where firms remit sales taxes and have access to tax-evasion possibilities. In light of
difficult causal identification with observational data, we design a controlled exper-
iment in which buyers and sellers trade a fictitious good in competitive markets. A
per-unit tax is imposed on sellers, and sellers in the treatment group are provided
the opportunity to evade the tax whereas sellers in the control group are not. We
find that the equilibrium market price in the treatment group is lower than in the
control group, and the number of traded units is higher in treatment markets. The
results further show that the after-tax incomes of sellers increase through the eva-
sion opportunity despite the lower prices. Our findings have implications for tax
incidence. We show that sellers with access to evasion shift a smaller share of the
nominal tax rate onto buyers relative to sellers without tax evasion opportunities.
In addition, we find that sellers with evasion opportunities shift the full amount of
their effective tax rate onto buyers. Additional experimental treatments show that
this full shifting of the effective tax burden is due to the evasion opportunity itself
rather than the evasion-induced lower effective tax rate.
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1 Introduction
It is well documented that many firms and self-employed individuals engage in tax-
avoidance and tax-evasion activities (e.g., Slemrod 2007, Hanlon et al. 2007, Dyreng
et al. 2008, Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, Schneider et al. 2010, Kleven et al. 2011,
Armstrong et al. 2012, Artavanis et al. 2016). Tax evasion and avoidance activities have
the common effect of allowing firms to reduce their tax liability through under-reporting
(legally or illegally) their tax base. This evasion/avoidance-induced reduction of the tax
burden potentially gives firms scope for offering their goods at lower prices, and thereby
increase demand for their goods. Although this mechanism has intuitive appeal, there
is very little empirical evidence of whether avoidance and evasion opportunities of firms
affect consumption prices. The goal of this paper is to study the causal effect of evasion
and avoidance opportunities of sellers on market prices. We focus on a situation where
firms remit sales taxes and have an opportunity to evade these taxes. Our precise research
question is: are prices different in markets where the evasion of sales taxes is an option
relative to markets where sales taxes cannot be evaded?
Data for the empirical analysis are generated in a between-subject-design laboratory
experiment1 where participants trade fictitious goods in a competitive double auction
market (Smith 1962, Dufwenberg et al. 2005). Experimental participants are randomly
assigned roles as sellers or buyers in treatment and control groups, and a per-unit sales
tax is imposed on all sellers. Sellers in the treatment group make a tax-reporting decision
and are therefore able to under-report the number of units sold, whereas sellers in the
control group have their correct tax liability deducted automatically. Evasion costs,
including audit probability and fine rate, are exogenous. Because the only difference
between the treatment and control group is access to evasion, we attribute any occurring
price differences between the two groups to the evasion opportunity.
Our decision to use a laboratory experiment is based on the fact that causal identi-
fication requires random variation in access to evasion across otherwise similar markets.
This is difficult to achieve using observational data since access to tax evasion/avoidance
is most likely one of the dimensions of a market that determines whether buyers and sell-
ers select to participate in that market. In other words, it is always an endogenous choice
of any firm to operate in markets where evasion/avoidance is an option. This makes it
very difficult to identify the causal effect of avoidance on outcomes using observational
1Laboratory experiments are frequently used in taxation and accounting research; examples include:
Anctil et al. (2004), Ruﬄe (2005), Hobson and Kachelmeier (2005), Riedl and Tyran (2005), Fortin
et al. (2007), Alm et al. (2009), Tayler and Bloomfield (2011), Chen et al. (2012), Maas et al. (2012),
Blumkin et al. (2012), Falsetta et al. (2013), Grosser and Reuben (2013), Doerrenberg and Duncan
(2014), Balafoutas et al. (2015), Barron and Qu (2014), Elliot et al. (2015), Hales et al. (2015),
Banerjee and Maier (2016), Majors (2016), Blaufus et al. (2017), Bernard et al. (2018), Brueggen et al.
(2018). We discuss the external validity of our laboratory experiment in Section 5.4.
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data. Relying on the controlled environment of the laboratory means that we are able
to avoid much of these identification problems and thus produce causal evidence of the
effect of tax evasion on outcomes. In particular, we are able to randomly assign whether
sellers have access to evasion opportunities or not.
Although the setting is artificial, randomized laboratory experiments have been used
extensively to study price effects of taxes. Various laboratory studies have found that the
theoretical results of tax incidence – without evasion – hold in competitive experimental
markets such as a double auction (Kachelmeier et al. 1994; Borck et al. 2002; Ruﬄe 2005).
This suggests that the laboratory is an appropriate setting to study the interplay between
taxes and prices. We therefore introduce tax evasion to an environment that has been
shown to provide credible results in the context of prices and taxation.2 The tax-evasion
component of our experiment also builds on established work from laboratory experiments
(e.g., Ruﬄe 2005, Fortin et al. 2007, Doerrenberg and Duncan 2014, Balafoutas et al.
2015, Blaufus et al. 2016, Kogler et al. 2016). Our experimental design thus combines
established design features from the experimental literature strands on double auctions,
tax incidence and tax evasion.
The empirical results show that the equilibrium price in the treatment group with
tax evasion is statistically and economically lower than in the control group. Accordingly,
the number of units traded is higher in the case with evasion. These findings provide
clean evidence that evasion opportunities for firms cause lower prices and higher trading
quantities. This empirical result is consistent with the predictions that we derive to
rationalize the experiment. We predict lower prices and higher quantities in markets
with evasion opportunities. The simple reason for this prediction is that sellers with an
evasion option are able to reduce their effective tax rate relative to those without evasion.
This allows firms with evasion opportunities to offer their goods at lower prices. On the
market level, evasion-induced reductions in effective tax rates imply that the tax causes
the industry supply curve to shift up by a smaller amount relative to situations without
access to evasion.
Our empirical results further show that sellers increase their after-tax profits through
the evasion opportunity. This implies that the revenue gains of increasing the number
of units sold combined with under-reporting the tax base compensates for the revenue
loss of selling at lower prices in the treatments with access to evasion. Not surprisingly,
buyers also have higher net incomes in the presence of tax evasion. Overall, the increase
in after-tax incomes through the evasion opportunity is higher for sellers than for buyers.
We use the price effects that we find to investigate which share of the nominal and
effective tax rate firms shift onto buyers.3 In other words, we use our main findings to
2We employ an experimental double auction similar to Grosser and Reuben (2013). Riedl (2010)
provides an overview of experimental tax incidence research.
3Throughout the paper, we refer to the tax rate that is legally due as the nominal tax rate. However,
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determine the incidence of the sales taxes on prices. We document the following incidence
results. First, the share of the nominal tax rate on sellers that is borne by buyers is
approximately 50 percent lower in the presence of evasion. This finding suggests that
access to tax evasion changes the economic incidence of the nominal tax rate. Second, we
find that sellers with an evasion opportunity shift their full effective tax rate onto buyers.
Results from an additional treatment, in which the effective tax rate is exogenously
lowered to the effective rate observed in the evasion treatments, suggest that the full
shifting of the effective tax rate is due to the evasion opportunity itself rather than the
evasion-induced lowering of the effective tax rate. One interpretation of this finding is
that sellers desire to be compensated for the risk associated with evasion.
The relevance and importance of our findings is especially evident when one con-
siders the prevalence of tax evasion and avoidance across the world (e.g., Slemrod 2007,
Hanlon et al. 2007, Dyreng et al. 2008, Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, Schneider et al. 2010,
Kleven et al. 2011, Armstrong et al. 2012, Artavanis et al. 2016). Transaction taxes,
which we focus on in our study, are of particular interest in this context. For example,
sales tax gap estimates range from 2 percent to 41 percent for the value added tax in
the European Union and 1 percent to 19.5 percent for the retail sales tax in the United
States (see Mikesell 2014 for a review of sales tax evasion estimates). Additionally, it
is generally accepted that ‘use-tax’ evasion by both businesses and individuals is much
higher than retail sales tax evasion; e.g., GAO (2000) assume non-compliance rates of 20
to 50 percent among businesses and 95 to 100 percent among individuals in a study of
the potential revenue losses of e-commerce.4
Therefore, our results are relevant in countries such as the United States where the
Supreme Court’s ruling in South Dakota v Wayfair is expected to change the way out-
of-state merchants are treated with respect to retail sales tax collection. In particular, a
number of states are expected to follow South Dakota’s lead in requiring out-of-state firms
to serve as tax collectors, thus changing the tax evasion opportunities that previously
existed with the Use-Tax. There have also been a push to restrict the sale of “zappers”,
which are used to evade sales taxes among firms. Our findings suggest that, all else equal,
such measures are likely to result in higher prices as affected sellers fully adjust to the retail
sales tax. While we focus on sales taxes here, the findings also suggest that other anti-tax
evasion initiatives, such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), are likely
to affect the level of economic activity as affected parties respond to the reduced evasion
opportunities. The general rationale behind our results also applies to tax avoidance and
some taxpayers evade part of their legal tax liability, which effectively reduces the tax rate due. The
effective tax rate then refers to actual tax payment as a share of true taxable income, accounting for
fines. See Section 3 for a more comprehensive definition.
4Consumers in the United States are required to pay ‘use-tax’ in lieu of the retail sales tax if the seller
is not required – by law – to register as a tax collector in the consumers’ state.
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recent measures to reduce avoidance activities of firms (such as OECD Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting, BEPS or Country by Country Reporting, CbCR). As with evasion, tax
avoidance possibilities allow firms to reduce their tax liability and therefore potentially
offer goods at lower prices. In this regard, our results suggest that anti-avoidance policies
potentially increase prices and reduce traded quantities.
Our paper contributes to different strands of literature. First, our paper adds to
the general tax evasion literature.5 Naturally, obtaining credible causal evidence in the
context of tax evasion is very difficult using observational studies (Slemrod and Weber
2012). A broad strand of literature has therefore employed randomized experiments to
study evasion (see references above). However, unlike most of the tax-evasion literature,
we focus on the implications of tax evasion rather than on explaining tax evasion, and
we focus on transaction taxes rather than income taxes.6 In particular, we show that
price setting is affected by evasion opportunities. Additionally, our results support the
general notion that economic outcomes – such as prices and quantities – are affected by
tax evasion behavior (e.g., Andreoni et al. 1998).
Second, we relate to the literature on tax avoidance of firms.7 Although our partic-
ular set-up studies tax evasion, rather than avoidance, the general mechanism behind our
results also applies to avoidance (see above).8 It is well documented that tax avoidance
of firms is very common, especially among multinational firms (see for example Hanlon
et al. 2007). However, literature on the implications and consequences of avoidance
is rather scarce – presumably because of the previously discussed inherent endogeneity
problem that avoidance options are not randomly assigned to firms. Exemplary excep-
tions are papers studying the consequences of tax avoidance in equity capital markets
(Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Wilson 2009; Goh et al. 2016).
We relate to this stream of papers in that we study an additional dimension of potential
tax-avoidance consequences, namely prices and number of sold units.
Third, we relate to several studies that attempt to identify the incidence of taxes
using observational data.9 To overcome the challenges of identifying causal effects using
5Andreoni et al. (1998), Alm (2012) and Slemrod (2017) provide general surveys on tax-compliance
research. Recent examples of evasion research include Artavanis et al. (2016), Hallsworth et al. (2017),
and Alstadsaeter et al. (2019).
6In an overview article on tax research, Dyreng and Maydew (2018) identify that there is little research
on non-income-based taxes (such as sales taxes) in the literature. They consider this lack of research to
be surprising in light of the importance and prevalence of these types of taxes around the world. Our
focus on sales taxes and their effects on prices thus contributes to closing this gap in the literature.
7Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) present a survey. Examples of recent work on tax avoidance include
Simone (2016) and Hopland et al. (2018).
8The close link between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is for example emphasized by
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) who highlight that the distinction between avoidance and evasion is very
difficult. The close link between the two approaches to reducing the tax liability supports our notion
that the results from our evasion context have implications for cases of tax avoidance.
9For example, Alm et al. (2009) and Marion and Muehlegger (2011) find that the incidence of the
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observational data, several studies explore the question of economic incidence in a labo-
ratory setting. For example, Kachelmeier et al. (1994), Quirmbach et al. (1996), Borck
et al. (2002), and Ruﬄe (2005) find that the theoretical predictions of tax incidence hold
true in a competitive laboratory market with full information.10 We add to this strand of
the literature by introducing tax evasion to a standard competitive experimental double-
auction market, and show that this changes the incidence of the tax. This finding is
important because it suggests that tax equivalence, which is the focus of the existing
laboratory tax incidence literature, is unlikely to hold in the real world where buyers and
sellers have different access to evasion.
Two studies more closely related to ours in that they estimate economic incidence in
the presence of tax evasion are Alm and Sennoga (2010) and Kopczuk et al. (2016). The
latter provides empirical evidence that the stage of production at which the tax on diesel
is collected in the US affects the economic incidence of the tax. Although they suggest
that this difference is driven by variation in access to evasion across production stages,
reliance on observational data makes it difficult to cleanly identify whether this effect is
fully due to variation in compliance behavior. Alm and Sennoga (2010) use a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the economic incidence of tax evasion for a
“typical” developing country. They find that the benefits of evasion generally do not stay
with the evader if there is free entry, which suggests that evasion changes the incidence
of taxes. Since we rely on the controlled environment of the lab, our empirical approach
provides precise control over the market institutions, which allows us to randomize access
to evasion and measure non-compliance accurately. As a result, we are able to offer cleaner
identification of the impact of tax evasion on the economic incidence of the tax than these
two studies. Nonetheless, we view our work as complementary to these papers. The
illusive nature of tax evasion implies that consistent results across multiple techniques is
required if we are to draw firm conclusions about causes and consequences of tax evasion.
Fourth, our paper joins a growing literature showing that institutions matter for the
effects of taxes. For example, Slemrod and Gillitzer (2013) put forward the “tax-systems”
approach and argue that tax analysis has to consider all aspects of taxation, particularly
aspects of administration, compliance, and remittance. Our paper supports this view in
that it shows that taxes have different effects when the institution in place does not close
all opportunities for non-compliance.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the experimental
design in section 2, the theoretical predictions in section 3 and the main results in section
fuel tax in the US is fully shifted to final consumers and related to supply and demand conditions, Saez
et al. (2012) find that tax equivalence does not hold in the context of the Greek payroll tax, and Fuest
et al. (2018) find that the burden of local business taxes in Germany partly falls on employees via lower
wages. Other examples include Evans et al. (1999), Gruber and Koszegi (2004), and Rothstein (2010).
10Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) and Riedl and Tyran (2005) find that the laws of tax incidence
do not translate to non-competitive experimental markets.
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4. Our findings are discussed in section 5. We also present the results of an additional
treatment in section 5 which helps us to rationalize our tax-incidence findings. Section 6
concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Overview
The experimental design reflects a standard competitive experimental double auction
market as pioneered by Smith (1962).11 The auction and the parameters in our exper-
iment are based on Grosser and Reuben (2013). In each round of the double auction
market, 5 buyers and 5 sellers trade two units of a homogeneous and fictious good. Sell-
ers are assigned costs for each unit and buyers are assigned values. The roles of sellers
and buyers as well as the costs and values are exogenous and randomly assigned to the lab
participants. We impose a per-unit tax on sellers – which we refer to as the nominal tax
rate – to this set-up and give sellers in the treatment group the opportunity to evade the
tax whereas sellers in the control group pay the per-unit tax automatically (as with exact
withholding). We employ a between-subjects design where each participant is either in
the control or treatment group. Further details on the experimental design are provided
in the next subsections.
2.2 Organization
The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER),
University of Cologne, Germany. A large random sample of all subjects in the labora-
tory’s subject pool of approximately 4000 persons was invited via email – using the
recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2015) – to participate in the experiment. Partic-
ipants signed up on a first-come-first-serve basis. Neither the content of the experiment
nor the expected payoff was stated in the invitation email. The experiment was pro-
grammed utilizing z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007). We ran eight sessions over two
regular school days in November and December 2013.12 Each session consisted of either
a control or treatment group market and lasted about 100 minutes (including review of
instructions and payment of participants).
11Double auction markets mimic a perfectly competitive market. Dufwenberg et al. (2005), for ex-
ample, rely on an experimental double auction to study financial markets. Holt (1995) provides an
overview.
12We ran additional experimental treatment sessions in July 2015. This section provides details for
the first set of experiments, the details regarding the additional treatment are in section 5.3. There are
two regular semesters at the tertiary level in Germany; winter semester lasting from October to March
and summer semester between April and July. Therefore, the experiment was implemented during the
regular semester.
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We conduct four control and four treatment sessions for a total of 80 subjects.13
Experimental Currency Units (ECU) are used as the currency during the experiment.
After the experiment, ECU are converted to Euro with an exchange of 30 ECU = 1 EUR
and subjects are paid the sum of all net incomes (see below) in Euro. It was public
information that all tax revenue generated in the experiment would be donated to the
German Red Cross.
At the beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to computer
boothes by drawing an ID number out of a bingo bag upon entering the lab. The com-
puter then randomly assigns each subject to role as buyer or seller, as well as her costs
or values which stay constant during the experiment. Subjects are given a hard copy
of the instructions when they enter the lab and are allowed as much time as needed to
familiarize themselves with the procedure of the experiment. They are also allowed to
ask any clarifying questions. The instructions are identical for the control and treatment
group except for information on the reporting decision and net income of sellers. These
differences in the instructions are highlighted in appendix section C.
2.3 Description of a session
Each session includes 1 market that is either a control or treatment group market. Each
market has five buyers and five sellers who each have 2 units of a fictitious good to trade.
Sellers and buyers are randomly assigned costs and values for both of their units. These
values and costs come from a predefined distribution that was the same across treatments,
and the random assignment to costs and units is without replacement. The roles as buyer
or seller and the assigned values and costs are exogenously determined and stay constant
for the entire experiment. All ten subjects in one session/market first trade in 3 practice
rounds and then 27 payoff relevant rounds.
Trade in the Double Auction. As is common in experimental markets, subjects are
given demand and supply schedules for a fictitious good at the beginning of the session
(Ruﬄe 2005; Cox et al. 2018; Grosser and Reuben 2013). The demand schedule for
buyers assigns a value to each of two items and the supply schedule for sellers assigns a
cost to each of two items. The cost/value of the units vary across items and subjects as
illustrated in Table 1. This allows us to induce demand and supply curves for each market,
which are depicted in Figure 1. The schedules are chosen such that demand and supply
elasticities are equal in equilibrium. The demand and supply schedules remain fixed
across periods in a given session, and they do not differ between control and treatment
markets.
13See section 4.2.1 for summary statistics on demographic characteristics of the participants.
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Subjects trade the good in a double auction market that is opened for two minutes
in each period. During this time, each seller can post an “ask” that is lower than the
current ask on the market, but higher than the cost of the item to the seller. In other
words, sellers cannot trade an item below its cost. Additionally, sellers must sell their
cheaper unit before they sell their more expensive unit. Similarly, each buyer can post
a “bid” that is higher than the current bid on the market, but lower than the value of
the item to the buyer. Therefore, buyers cannot buy an item at a price that exceeds its
value. Buyers must also buy their most valued item before their least valued item. The
lowest standing ask and the highest standing bid are displayed on the computer screen
of all ten market participants.14
An item is traded if a seller accepts the standing buyer bid or a buyer accepts the
standing seller ask. Subjects are not required to trade a minimum amount of items,
items that are not traded yield neither costs nor profits. Traders are not allowed to
communicate with each other. This trading procedure is identical for the treatment and
control groups.
Income: Control Group. Gross-income in each period consists of the sum of the
profit on each unit traded. Sellers’ gross profit on each unit is equal to the difference
between the selling price and cost, while buyers’ profit on each unit is the difference
between value and price paid. All subjects (buyers and sellers) are told that sellers have
to pay a per-unit tax for each unit sold, that the tax rate is fixed across all periods at
τ = 10 ECU per-unit and that the tax is collected at the end of every third trading
period. In other words, subjects complete three rounds of trading then tax is collected
from sellers, then three more rounds of trading then another tax collection and so on.
This yields 27 trading periods and 9 tax collections; we discuss this design feature below.
We define total gross profit in each trading period i (i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 25, 26, 27) as
Πsi = Pi1d1 + Pi2d2 − C1d1 − C2d2, (1)
for sellers and
Πbi = V1d1 + V2d2 − Pi1d1 − Pi2d2, (2)
for buyers. Superscripts s and b indicate seller and buyer, respectively, dj = 1 if good j
is traded and 0 otherwise, Pij is the price of good j in period i, Cj is the cost of good j
and Vj is the value of good j.
Because taxes are collected at the end of every third trading period, a seller’s net
14Figure 9 in the appendix depicts a screenshot of the experimental market place for a seller in the
treatment group with evasion opportunity.
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income for each tax collection period k (k = 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27) is equal to:
pisk = Π
s
k + Π
s
k−1 + Π
s
k−2 − τU, (3)
where U is the total number of units sold in the last three rounds and τ = 10 is the
nominal per-unit tax rate. Because buyers do not pay a tax, their net income for each
tax collection period may be written as:
pibk = Π
b
k + Π
b
k−1 + Π
b
k−2 (4)
Both buyers and sellers are shown their gross income after every trading period and their
net income after every tax collection period. Subjects’ final payoff is the sum of their net
incomes from the nine tax collection periods.
Income: Treatment Group. Since buyers do not pay the tax, the calculation of gross
and net income for buyers in the treatment group is identical to that of the control group:
see equations (2) and (4). Sellers, on the other hand, make a tax reporting decision at
the end of every third round. In other words, subjects complete three rounds of trading
then sellers make a reporting decision; then three more rounds of trading then another
reporting decision and so on.
One advantage of allowing subjects to report after every third trading period is that
it increases the probability that every subject has a positive amount to report and must
therefore explicitly decide if they wish to under-report sales for tax purposes. Another
advantage is that it yields 9 reporting decisions. This is advantageous because it means
that subjects can learn the implications of tax evasion for their profits and update their
beliefs about the probability of being caught. As a result, we can be assured that the
market equilibrium in the evasion treatment reflects the impact of tax evasion on the
behaviour of market participants. Although reporting every period would maximize the
number of reporting decisions, we opted against this option because excess supply in
the market implies that some subjects will sell zero units in a given trading period,
which trivializes the reporting decision. Another option is to have subjects make a single
reporting decision at the end of the experiment. While this approach maximizes the
chance that everyone has a positive amount to report, having a single reporting decision
would not allow subjects to learn or update their beliefs. We opted for every third round
as a reasonable compromise between these two extremes.15
Sellers can report any number between 0 and the true amount sold in the previous
three trading periods, and the reported amount is taxed at τ = 10 ECU per-unit. Sellers
15Although subjects in the control group do not make a reporting decision, we collect taxes and report
their net profits at the end of every third period to ensure comparability with the treatment group.
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face an exogenous audit probability of γ = 0.1 (10 percent) and pay a fine, which is
equal to twice the evaded taxes if they underreport sales and are audited. The tax rate,
audit probability, and fine rate are fixed across periods and sessions, and all subjects –
buyers and sellers – in the treatment group receive this information at the beginning of
the experiment.
Therefore, unlike sellers in the control group who must pay taxes on each unit sold,
sellers in the treatment group are able to evade the sales tax by underreporting sales.
Sellers’ gross income in any trading period i is the same as in equation (1), but their net
income in each tax collection period is rewritten as:
pisk =
Πsk + Πsk−1 + Πsk−2 − τR if not audited,Πsk + Πsk−1 + Πsk−2 − τU − τ(U −R) if audited, (5)
where R is the reported number of units sold, U is the number of units actually sold over
the last three rounds, and τ = 10 is the nominal per-unit tax rate. Subjects’ final payoff
is the sum of their net incomes from the nine tax collection periods.
2.4 Market Equilibrium without Evasion
The demand and supply schedules described in Table 1 and displayed in Figure 1 can
be used to determine the competitive equilibrium price and quantity with and without
the per-unit tax. Theoretically, we expect the market to clear with 7 units traded at any
price in the range 48 ECU to 52 ECU in the case without taxes. We obtain a range of
prices in equilibrium because the demand schedule is stepwise linear (Ruﬄe 2005; Cox
et al. 2018; Grosser and Reuben 2013).16
A per-unit tax on sellers increases the cost of each unit by 10 ECU and thus shifts the
supply curve to the left as shown in Figure 1. In the absence of tax evasion opportunities,
this theoretically produces a new equilibrium quantity of 6 units, which is supported by
an equilibrium price in the range of 53 ECU to 57 ECU. Because the linearized form of
the demand and supply schedules have equal elasticity in equilibrium, the incidence of
the tax should theoretically be shared equally between buyers and sellers; buyers pay an
extra 5 ECU and sellers receive 5 ECU less (after paying the tax), relative to the case
without a tax.17
16Grosser and Reuben (2013) conducted an experiment using the same demand and supply schedule
as we do and find that the “no-tax” equilibrium is equal to that predicted by the theory. Therefore,
although we do not implement the “no-tax” treatment here, we expect that our “no-tax” equilibrium is
in line with theoretical expectations.
17We are aware that the price elasticities are not properly defined in equilibrium given that the demand
and supply schedules are only piece-wise linear. However, for ease of exposition, we assume the the
schedules are linear in order to illustrate the likely economic incidence of the per-unit tax. Notice that
the linearized form of the schedules have equal slopes and thus equal elasticities in equilibrium.
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The question we seek to answer is whether this equilibrium outcome is affected by
the presence of tax evasion opportunities among sellers. The next section provides a
theoretical discussion for why tax evasion may or may not affect prices, quantities, and
the incidence of the tax.
3 Conceptual Framework
This section describes the relationship between evasion opportunities, market prices,
traded quantities, and the incidence of taxes in the context of our experiment.
Prices and quantities. For simplicity, let’s assume that demand and supply curves
are linear, and that the evasion decision is made jointly with the decision to sell. Using
these assumptions, Figure 2 illustrates the effect of tax evasion on price and quantity
for the cases with and without evasion. First, consider panel A, which represents the
control group where evasion is not possible. As in the standard textbook case, the supply
curve shifts up by the full amount of the nominal tax rate. This results in a new market
equilibrium (pc, qc); where subscript c indicates control group.
Sellers in the treatment group have the opportunity to evade taxes by hiding a
fraction of their sales. A seller who underreports sales and is not audited faces an effective
tax rate that is lower than the nominal tax rate faced by sellers in the control group.
Given the deterrence parameters in our experiment – audit probability of 10% and a fine
equal to twice the evaded taxes – , we expect that a large fraction of sellers will evade
and thus face this lower effective tax rate.18 As illustrated in panel B of Figure 2, this
then implies that the market supply curve in the presence of evasion opportunities shifts
up by less than the nominal tax rate. This results in a new market equilibrium at (pt, qt);
subscript t indicates treatment group.
This intuition leads to a qualitative prediction: the equilibrium price in the treat-
ment group with evasion opportunities will be lower than in the control group where
evasion is not an option; i.e., (pt < pc). Accordingly, the number of units sold will be
higher in the treatment group than in the control group; i.e., (qt > qc).
The quantitative difference between the equilibrium prices and quantities in the
control and treatment group is determined by the magnitude of the shift in the treatment
group’s market supply curve. This shift is positively related to the effective tax rate faced
by sellers in the treatment group. Note that sellers have to pay the nominal per-unit
(excise) tax τ for each unit they sell, but are provided a tax reporting decision. The tax
reporting decision is audited with an exogenous probability γ, and because all audits lead
18This expectation of positive tax evasion is supported by evidence from the field (e.g., Kleven et al.
2011) and the lab (e.g., Alm 2012).
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to the full discovery of actual sales, a fine equal to twice the evaded taxes must be paid
if audited. This implies that seller i has to pay an (expected) effective tax rate of:
tei =
τ(ri + 2γ(si − ri))
si
, (6)
where si denotes the number of units a seller actually sells and ri is the number of units
she reports.19 This simple equation shows that the effective tax rate is increasing in
the nominal tax rate and decreasing in evasion (for γ < 0.5). Therefore, an increase in
evasion implies a smaller shift in the market supply curve. While it is plausible to expect
that the evasion rate will be larger than zero, it is difficult to predict the exact level of
evasion ex-ante, and it is therefore not possible to make any predictions regarding the
quantitative effects of the treatment on prices and quantities.20
An alternative qualitative prediction arises if we assume that sellers treat their
evasion and selling decisions as separable; i.e., sellers first set a price at which to sell,
and then later make their evasion decision.21 In this case, the opportunity to evade
has no bearing on the market price and hence the incidence of the tax is unaffected
by the presence of tax evasion among sellers (see Yaniv 1995 for an example of this
type of model). However, in a set-up with endogenous audits, the separability result
breaks down and incidence is affected by evasion opportunity (Marrelli 1984; Lee 1998;
Bayer and Cowell 2009). It is eventually an empirical question whether or not sellers
make the reporting and selling decisions separately – even in the absence of endogenous
audits. We find it plausible that sellers – who know they will be able to underreport
sales – take their tax evasion opportunities into account when setting prices. Tax evasion
opportunities make it possible to remain profitable at lower prices.
Incidence. We estimate the economic incidence in two ways: (i) economic incidence of
the nominal tax rate and (ii) economic incidence of the effective tax rate. In the context
of the experiment, the former refers to the share of 10 ECU, the nominal per-unit tax
rate in the experiment, that sellers shift to buyers. Expressed differently, this is the
difference between the equilibrium price in a no-tax scenario and the equilibrium price
that we observe in our experiment. Considering the above rationale regarding prices and
19The seller’s tax liability (including any fines) is (τri) with probability (1−γ), and (τsi+τ(si−ri)) with
probability γ. Therefore, the expected effective tax rate can be written as tei =
(1−γ)τri+γ(τsi+τ(si−ri))
si
,
which is equivalent to equation (6). Note that this effective tax rate reduces to the nominal tax rate τ
for sellers who either do not evade or do not have an option to evade.
20It is difficult to predict the exact level of evasion, because, as we know from the tax-evasion literature,
the decision to evade is complex and depends on several factors including the nominal tax rate, deterrence
parameters, the (biased) perception of audit probabilities, the degree of risk aversion, and the intrinsic
motivation to pay taxes.
21This is analogous to other types of uncertainty models; for example, investment models in which
the decision over how much to invest in total is separable from the decision on how much to invest in
individual assets.
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quantities, we expect the economic incidence of the nominal tax rate to be larger in the
control than in the treatment group.
The incidence of the effective tax rate describes the share of the effective tax rate
that is shifted onto buyers. Recall from equation (6) that the effective tax rate is equal
to the nominal tax rate in the control group (ri = si), and lower than the nominal
tax rate in the treatment group (ri < si). Under the simplifying assumption that the
supply and demand elasticities are equal in equilibrium (see footnote 17), we derive from
textbook theory that the tax rate in the control group is shared equally between sellers
and buyers. That is, the incidence of the nominal tax rate, and hence the effective tax
rate, is predicted to be 50% in the control group.
Though the textbook theory would also predict a 50-50 split of the effective tax
rate in the treatment group, the presence of risky evasion opportunities may imply that
the incidence of the effective tax rate is different than 50% in the presence of evasion
opportunities. This deviation from the theoretically expected 50%-result may be due to
one of two reasons. First, because evasion is risky, it is possible that sellers shift more
than their effective tax burden onto buyers as a means of receiving compensation for the
evasion risk. Second, the evasion opportunity decreases the effective tax rate and sellers
might perceive it to be easier to shift a lower tax rate onto buyers. Both mechanisms
imply that the incidence of the effective tax rate is higher in the treatment group than
in the control group. While our main experimental design, as described before, allows
us to study the economic incidence of the nominal and effective tax rates in the control
and treatment groups, it is not suitable to disentangle these two potential channels. We
present an additional treatment in section 5.3 to be able to make this distinction.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
Recall that we are interested in identifying the impact of tax evasion opportunities on
prices and sold quantities. We describe the empirical strategy used to identify these
effects in section 4.1 and our findings in section 4.2.
4.1 Empirical Strategy
Definition of prices. Given the discussion in section 3, we are particularly interested
in knowing whether the market clearing price in the treatment group is different from that
in the control group. Therefore, the first step in our empirical strategy is to define the
market price. The experiment produced one price for each unit sold in a given market-
period, which allows us to create three measures of market price. The first measure is
simply the price at which each item is sold, which we denote P . We also calculate the
mean and median price in a given market-period and denote them P and P50, respectively.
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Therefore, our data set has one observation per market-period when price is measured
by P or P50 and n observations per market-period when market price is measured by P ,
where n is the number of units sold in that market-period.
Non-parametric analysis. Due to random assignment to groups and markets, any
(non-parametric) difference in these prices between the treatment and control groups is
taken as evidence of the presence of treatment effects. Because the period-specific prices
are not independent across the 27 periods within a given market, we implement our
non-parametric analysis (ranksum tests; see footnote 22) using the average price for each
market; that is, we use the average of P by market. This implies that our non-parametric
analysis is based on eight independent observations; four in the treatment and four in
the control groups.22
Regressions. We also test for treatment effects parametrically by regressing each mea-
sure of price, separately, on a treatment dummy. The baseline model for P is specified
as follows:
P i,m = β0 + δTm + i,m, (7)
where P i,m is the mean price of the good in period i (with i = 1, ..., 27) of market m (with
m = 1, ..., 8). Tm is a dummy for the treatment state, which is equal to one if treatment
group and zero if control group. i,m is a standard error term. Our coefficient of interest is
δ, which represents the difference in market price between the two groups. More precisely,
δ indicates the causal effect of evasion opportunity on the equilibrium market price. This
causal interpretation follows from the fact that the groups are identical except for access
to evasion and random assignment of participants to the two groups. We set up our
data as a panel with 27 periods per market and run pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions. To account for the dependence of prices across periods within a market,
we cluster standard errors on the market level.23 Because the treatment status of each
market and hence the participants in that market is always the same, the treatment
22While the number of independent observations, eight, appears to be low, it is not unprecedented to
use such few observations in empirical analysis; see for example Grosser and Reuben (2013) who apply
nonparametric tests based on four independent market-level observations and have sufficient statistical
power. We use the Stata routine provided by Harris and Hardin (2013), which adjusts the p-values to the
low number of observations, to implement ”exact” ranksum tests (these are based on Wilcoxon 1945 and
Mann and Whitney 1947). We detect differences between treatment groups with significant precision,
which suggests that the number of observations is sufficient in our study.
23Note that estimators that allow for censoring, such as Tobit models, are unnecessary since the market
price is not censored. Although the market price could be no lower than 18 and no higher the 82, the
distribution of market prices suggest that these prices were never binding; the lowest market price is 30
and the highest is 63.
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effect is identified using a between-market design.24 We include period fixed effects in
some specifications.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Summary Statistics
After the experiment, subjects reported their age, gender, native language, level of tax
morale and field of study. Tax morale is determined using a question very similar to one
used in the World Values Survey (Inglehart nd).25 Each of these variables is summarized
in Table 2. Casual observation of the data shows that randomization into the treatment
states worked well. This is confirmed by non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for
differences in distributions between groups; we do not observe any statistically significant
differences in gender, age, share of participants whose native language is German, tax
morale or field of study across the two groups. While we do not explicitly measure other
attitudinal variables such as social norms or preferences, randomization implies that these
omitted variables are also balanced across groups and therefore do not have any effect
on our results. Among all participants, approximately 51% were male, 77% indicated
German to be their native language, and the average age was 26 years. Approximately
24% of subjects stated that cheating on taxes can never be justified and 48% indicated
that economics is their major field of study.
Table 2 also reports the compliance rate in the treatment group. We find that every
subject evaded some positive amount of sales at least once and 13 of the 20 sellers in the
treatment group fully pursued the profit maximizing rational strategy of full evasion in
every reporting period. As a result the mean compliance rate is approximately 7% among
all sellers in treatment group and 61% among those who report non-zero sales.26
24Notice that this also implies that it is not possible to estimate the treatment effect in the presence
of market fixed effects. Each individual is randomly assigned to a market and everyone in the market
has the same treatment status. Therefore, the treatment status of a market is the same as the treatment
status of the individuals trading in that market.
25“Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something in between: ‘Cheating on taxes if you have the chance’.” This is the most
frequently used question to measure tax morale in observational studies (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006 and
Halla 2012).
26This level of evasion is at the high end of evasion estimates in the experimental tax evasion literature
(e.g., Fortin et al. 2007; Alm et al. 2009; Alm et al. 2010; Coricelli et al. 2010). However, these studies
focus on income taxes and are therefore not directly comparable to our results. We do not know of
any sales tax experiments in the tax evasion literature. Evidence from the real world suggest that our
compliance rates are not unreasonable. For example, the compliance rate in our experiment is comparable
to the compliance rate for the ‘use’ tax in the United States; 0 to 5 percent among individuals (GAO
2000).
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4.2.2 Prices
Non-parametric results. The non-parametric results presented in Figures 3 and 4 and
Table 3 show clearly that the price in the treatment group is lower than in the control
group. Figure 3 reports the mean market price by period for the treatment and control
groups. The data show that the mean market price varied a lot in both groups in the first
10 to 14 trading periods. This is consistent with the existing literature, which generally
finds that double auction markets take approximately 8 to 10 rounds to converge (Ruﬄe
2005).
Although price in both groups converged in roughly the same number of periods, the
evolution of prices is different. Price increased steadily to equilibrium in the treatment
group, and behave erratically in the control group. For this reason, and as is common
in the literature, our primary results are based on data from trading periods 14 to 27
(we provide results for the full sample for illustrative purposes). The mean market price
in both groups stabilized after round 14: at approximately 54.36 ECU in the control
group and 51.65 ECU in the treatment group (see panel B of Table 3). This implies
that the mean market price in the treatment group is 2.71 ECU lower than in the control
group.27 As shown in Figure 4 and the second column of Table 3, median prices are also
lower in the treatment group than in the control group; the median price is 51.27 ECU
in the treatment group and 54.07 ECU in the control group, resulting in a treatment
effect of 2.80 ECU.
These differences in prices between the groups are statistically significant from zero;
the exact ranksum tests (two-sided) give p-values of 0.029 for differences in median prices,
and 0.057 for differences in average prices.28 In other words, we find that markets with
access to tax evasion trade at significantly lower prices than markets without access to
tax evasion. The experimental results are thus consistent with our qualitative prediction
that the market price will be lower in the treatment than in the control group.29
Regression results. We extend the analysis above by estimating equation (7) for the
mean market price as the dependent variable. The estimated treatment effect of -2.70
ECU reported in model 1 of Panel B of Table 4 is statistically different from zero at the
27Note that the estimated treatment effect is larger for the full sample (panel A). Because this sample
includes data before the market price converges, we prefer the estimate in panel B.
28Note that 0.029 is the lowest possible p-value for the exact ranksum test with 8 independent obser-
vations.
29Further evidence that tax evasion affects the market price is provided in Figures 7 and 8, which
report the cumulative distribution of mean and median market prices, respectively, for the treatment
and control groups. Both figures show clearly that the price in the control group is not drawn from
the same distribution as that in the treatment group. This conclusion is supported by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions; in both cases we reject the null that the distributions
are equal. This result also holds when we use the individual ask prices (P ) instead of mean or median
prices; results available upon request.
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1 percent level.30 This estimate remains significant at the 5 percent level even after cor-
recting for the small number of clusters using the wild-bootstrap-t procedure described
in Cameron et al. (2008); see Table 9 in appendix.31 Additionally, the estimate is robust
to the inclusion of period fixed effects (model 2), demographic covariates (model 3), both
period fixed effects and demographic covariates (model 4), and the definition of price
(Table 5). Estimating equation (7) with the median market price, P50, as our depen-
dent variable yields treatment effects of -1.60 ECU to -2.10 ECU that are statistically
different from zero at the 1% level (see Panel A of Table 5). Although these estimates
are approximately 0.70 to 1.00 ECU smaller than that reported in Panel B of Table 4,
they remain economically meaningful.32 These results confirm our earlier non-parametric
findings that the market price in the treatment group is significantly lower than in the
control group.
4.2.3 Units sold
We identify the treatment effect on units sold using the same strategy as above. In
particular, the non-parametric analysis is based on the mean number of units sold at
the market level, while the regression analysis is based on the number of units sold in a
market-period with standard errors clustered at the market-level.
Non-parametric results. The predictions in section 3 suggest that treatment markets
will clear at a lower price and higher quantity than the control-group markets. We have
already demonstrated that the market clearing price is lower in the treatment group.
This section shows that the treatment group also sold more units than the control group.
The results in Table 3 show that the mean number of units sold per period in the control
group is 5.96. On the other hand, the treatment group sold an average of 6.49 units
per period. The difference between units sold in the treatment and control group is
statistically significant with the lowest possible p-value of 0.029 (exact two-sided ranksum
test based on eight independent observations). In other words, the estimated treatment
effect of 0.5 units is statistically different from zero. The difference in sales between
the two groups is even more obvious when we look at the total number of units sold by
each group. Again, restricting attention to trading periods 15 to 27 (after the market
clears), we find that the treatment group sold a total of 336 units while the control group
30Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for the full sample. These results are reported for illustrative
purposes only since the market does not clear until around period 14.
31The correction is implemented using Stata code provided by Judson Caskey and is available here:
https://sites.google.com/site/judsoncaskey/data.
32We also estimate the model with the ask price for each unit sold as the dependent variable and
report the results in Panel B of Table 5. The estimated treatment effect in this case is -2.66 ECU to
-2.72 ECU, which is almost identical to that for the mean market price as reported in Panel B of Table
4.
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only sold 308 units. Corresponding numbers for periods 1 to 27 are 704 and 647 in the
treatment and control group, respectively. The experimental results hence confirm our
prediction that markets with access to evasion trade more units than markets without
evasion opportunities.
Regression results. These results are supported by results from a regression analysis
that are reported in Table 6. Focussing on Panel B, which reports results for periods
15 to 27, we find a statistically significant treatment effect of 0.6 units; relative to the
control group, the treatment group sold approximately 0.6 more units per period.
5 Discussion
The results presented in section 4.2 show that markets with sellers who have the oppor-
tunity to evade taxes trade more units and do so at lower prices than markets where tax
evasion is not possible. These main findings show that tax-evasion opportunities have
a causal effect on prices and quantities. The identified effects are consistent with the
predictions in section 3. According to the predictions, tax evasion lowers the effective tax
rate facing sellers, thus allowing them to trade at lower prices in a competitive market.
As a result, the industry supply curve shifts by less as in the case without access to
evasion.
In the following, we discuss the implications of our price and quantity effects, in
particular with respect to after-tax profits and tax incidence. We proceed as follows.
Section 5.1 discusses the effects of evasion on net incomes and profits. Section 5.2 explains
the incidence results in the context of the conceptual framework. Section 5.3 describes
an additional treatment that sheds more light on our tax-incidence results. The external
validity of our findings is discussed in section 5.4.
5.1 Treatment Effects on After-Tax Income
Our experimental design allows us to identify the effect of tax evasion on the net income
of buyers and sellers. Because markets with access to evasion trade at lower prices and
higher quantity, the presence of tax evasion should lead to an increase in buyers’ net
income relative to buyers in the control group. Additionally, sellers’ net income might
also increase despite the lower price because they only report a fraction of their true sales.
Our findings are consistent with these predictions. In the absence of tax evasion (i.e., in
the control group), total net income of buyers is 1, 161.25 ECU compared to sellers’ net
income of 959.25 ECU. The introduction of tax evasion opportunities increases buyers’
net income to 1, 375.75 ECU and sellers’ net income to 1, 322.75 ECU. This represents a
treatment effect of 214.5 ECU and 363.5 ECU for buyers and sellers, respectively.
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These treatment effects are consistent with the observed price changes. Buyers’
net incomes increase because they pay 2.7 ECU less per unit in the evasion treatment.
Although sellers in the evasion treatment receive 2.7 ECU less per unit, their effective tax
rate falls by a larger margin (approximately 7.5 ECU) due to their evasion opportunity.
As a result, both buyers and sellers experience an increase in net income, but sellers
receive a much larger increase.
5.2 Economic Incidence
Our conceptual framework predicts that the final tax burden shifted from sellers to buyers
is lower in the presence of evasion opportunities than it would otherwise be in the absence
of tax evasion. This is exactly what we find; we observe a mean compliance rate of 7%
among all sellers, which implies an average effective tax rate of approximately 2.56 ECU
among all sellers (see equation 6 to see how we calculate the effective tax rate). Sellers
facing these lower effective tax rates trade at lower prices.
So how does this response among sellers affect the incidence of the tax? In order to
answer this question, we first have to determine the incidence of the tax in the control
group, which requires knowing the market equilibrium in the absence of the tax. Although
we did not run a “no-tax” treatment, we are able to derive this “no-tax” equilibrium
by relying on theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence of Grosser and Reuben
(2013). As outlined in section 2.4, we expect the no-tax market to produce an equilibrium
with 7 units at a price in the range 48 ECU to 52 ECU. This prediction is supported by
empirical evidence in Grosser and Reuben (2013); they find a mean market price of 49.04
ECU (standard deviation: 1.3) and 7.03 (sd: 0.36) units in the “no-tax” equilibrium.
Using the “no-tax” result as a benchmark, in the following we discuss the economic
incidence of the nominal tax rate (10 ECU in both groups) and the effective tax rate (10
ECU in control group, and 2.56 ECU in the treatment group due to underreporting).
Using the results from Grosser and Reuben (2013) as a baseline for our incidence
analysis is supported by at least three reasons. First, we use the same double auction
as they do. Most importantly, the following components are identical: the number of
buyers and sellers in each market, length of a trading period, the demand and supply
schedules, the number of homogeneous goods to be traded, and the visual appearance of
the market place as coded using z-tree. Additionally, their experimental sessions were
run in the same laboratory as ours (Cologne, Germany), implying that the subject pool
is highly comparable and laboratory characteristics (e.g., composition of subjects, labo-
ratory facilities, quality of subject pool, university characteristics, etc) are held constant.
Second, the price they observe in their no-tax treatment is well within the theoretically-
predicted price range. Finally, there is very little order effects on trading prices in their
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within-subjects design.33
5.2.1 Nominal tax rate
How do evasion opprtunities affect the incidence of the nominal tax rate? The equilib-
rium price in the control group (with tax but no evasion opportunity) is 54.36 ECU (sd:
1.15), which is approximately 5 ECU above the “no-tax” equilibrium of 49.04 ECU. This
suggests that the incidence of the nominal tax burden in the control group is approxi-
mately shared equally between buyers and sellers since the nominal tax rate is 10 ECU
per unit. Again, this is consistent with the theoretical framework; since the demand and
supply schedules have equal price elasticity in equilibrium, the burden is expected to be
shared equally between buyers and sellers.
The next step is to determine the extent to which access to evasion affected the
economic incidence of the nominal tax. The mean market clearing price in the treatment
group (with tax and evasion opportunity) is 51.65 ECU (sd: 1.26). Considering the
nominal tax rate of 10 ECU per unit and the no-tax benchmark of 49.04 ECU, this implies
that buyers in the treatment group pay 26.1% (= (51.65− 49.04)/10) of the nominal tax
burden, compared to the ≈50% in the case without evasion. In other words, access to
evasion reduced the economic incidence of the tax on buyers by about 24 percentage
points. This treatment effect on incidence appears small when compared to the market
price. However, we argue that the relevant comparison is the share of the nominal tax
burden that the buyers paid in the control group. Since buyers paid 5 ECU of the nominal
tax of 10 ECU in the control group, the largest expected effect of evasion is a reduction
of 5 ECU. Therefore, using this baseline, a treatment effect of 2.71 ECU is very large.
These results on the economic incidence of the nominal tax rate are summarized in Table
7.
5.2.2 Effective tax rate
Finally, we wish to know whether access to evasion changed the incidence of the effective
tax rate. Because the effective tax rate is the same as the nominal tax rate in the
33Grosser and Reuben (2013) implement a within-subject design where each subject trades in a market
with a tax and a market without tax. The order of tax and no-tax treatments is randomized to control
for order effects, and we rely on their no-tax results as a benchmark for our incidence analyses. The mean
trading price is 48.37 ECU (sd: 0.99) among subjects who participated in the no-tax treatment before
the tax treatment and 49.04 ECU (sd: 1.3) among all no-tax treatments. The small difference between
49.04 ECU and 48.37 ECU indicates that order effects are tiny. This suggests that it is reasonable to
use the overall no-tax mean price as a benchmark for our incidence analysis. Note that subjects who
played the no-tax treatment first were aware that a second part would follow, but they were not given
the instructions until the first part of the experiment (i.e., trading without tax) was completed. This
implies that behavior in the no-tax treatment among those who play no-tax first is not confounded by
subsequent parts of the experiment. The results for subjects who played the no-tax scenario first are not
published but were requested from the authors.
20
control group, we already know that the effective tax rate is approximately shared equally
between buyers and sellers in the control group. How does this incidence result change in
the presence of tax evasion? Recall that the expected effective tax rate from equation (6)
is estimated to be 2.56 ECU. If sellers with evasion opportunity continued to share the
effective tax burden 50-50, we would expect the price in the treatment group to increase
by approximately 1.28 ECU (= 2.56/2) relative to the “no-tax” equilibrium of 49.04
ECU; that is to 50.32. However, this is not what we observe. The price in the treatment
group is 51.65 ECU, which suggests that sellers shift the full expected effective tax rate
onto buyers; buyers bear 2.61 ECU (= 51.65− 49.04) even though the effective tax rate
is 2.56 ECU. As a result, about 101.95% (= (51.65 − 49.04)/2.56) of a seller’s expected
effective tax rate is shifted onto buyers. These results on the economic incidence of the
effective tax rate are summarized in the first three rows of Table 8.
5.3 Additional Treatment
This result raises an interesting question: why do we observe full shifting of the effective
tax rate in the evasion treatment whereas we observe the theoretically expected 50-50
shifting in the control group? We suspect this is due to one of two reasons. First, this
could be due the fact that the effective tax rate is lower in the treatment group. The
lower effective tax rate in the evasion treatment might make it easier to shift more of the
tax burden onto buyers. Second, this might be due to the evasion opportunity. Sellers
might attempt to shift enough of their tax burden onto buyers because they desire to
be compensated for the risk associated with evasion. We ran three additional sessions in
order to separate this pure evasion effect from the effect of the lower effective tax rate.
Below we describe the design and results from this additional treatment.
5.3.1 Design
The additional sessions are identical to the previous control sessions except that the
effective tax is exogenously lowered to 2.5 ECU, which is the same as the effective tax
rate in the evasion treatment.34 As in the previous treatments, the nominal tax rate is set
at 10 ECU, but sellers are told that they will receive a credit of 7.5 ECU for every unit
they sell. Sellers do not make a reporting decision. Instead, all tax calculations including
the tax credit adjustment are done automatically. Therefore, sellers in the additional
treatment face an effective tax rate that is lower than their nominal tax rate. More
importantly, there are no risks associated with this lowered effective tax rate. Although
the effective tax rate is the same as in the evasion treatments, sellers in those treatments
34The effective tax rate in the evasion treatment is actually 2.56 ECU. However, we opted for 2.5 ECU
because it is easier for subjects to mentally calculate while making their sales and purchasing decisions.
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had to take on audit risk in order to arrive at this lower effective tax rate.
Operationally, the only difference between the additional treatment and the control
group (i.e., without evasion) is the inclusion of the tax credit; everything else is the same.
The differences in the instructions that subjects read at the beginning of the experiment
are highlighted in appendix section C. We ran three sessions that lasted approximately
100 minutes each in July 2015 at the University of Cologne. The sessions were conducted
in the same lab as before, but none of the subjects had participated in the previous
sessions. There were 10 subjects (five buyers and five sellers) in each session, and the
average pay-off was 22 EUR.
5.3.2 Results
The results from this additional treatment are reported in Figure 6 and Table 8. We
find that the average equilibrium price in the additional treatment is 50.09 ECU (sd:
2.16), which is lower than the price in both the evasion and control groups.35 Though
the equilibrium price in the additional treatment is more than 1.50 ECU lower than in
the evasion treatments, we cannot reject the null that the price difference between these
two treatments is zero. Still, this price difference is economically meaningful. Notice that
consumers in the deduction treatment pay 1.05 ECU (= 50.09 − 49.04) of the nominal
tax rate, while those in the evasion treatment pay 2.61 ECU and those in the control
group pay 5.32 ECU. This implies that sellers in the additional treatment shifted 42.0%
(= (50.09− 49.04)/2.5) of their effective tax burden onto buyers.
Importantly, this shifting of the effective tax rate is considerably lower than the full
shifting of the effective tax rate that we observe in the evasion treatments – despite the
fact that the effective tax rate is the same. This provides suggestive evidence that the
evasion opportunity itself, rather than the lower effective tax rate, is the main driver of
the full shifting that we observe in the evasion treatments.
The net incomes of both sellers and buyers increase in the additional treatment
relative to the control group; the increase amounts to 373 ECU for buyers and 326.75 ECU
for sellers, both relative to the control group. This is consistent with the observation that
the equilibrium price in the deduction treatment is lower than in the evasion treatment,
which explains that for buyers the positive effect of the deduction is larger than the effect
of the evasion opportunity (recall that the net income of buyers in the evasion treatment
was 214.5 ECU higher than in the control group). In contrast, because sellers in the
deduction treatment face the same tax rate as in the evasion treatment, but receive a
lower price, the positive effect of the deduction on net income of sellers is lower than the
effect of the evasion opportunity (recall that net income in the evasion group was 363.5
ECU higher than in the control group).
35As before, our empirical analysis is based on data from periods 15 to 27.
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5.4 External Validity
As with all economic laboratory experiments, there remains doubt about the external
validity of our results.36 One general concern is that the setting in the lab is abstract
and artificial. However, the literature shows that laboratory double auctions, which we
use in our experiment, generate very plausible equilibria (e.g., Smith 1962; Holt 1995;
Dufwenberg et al. 2005; Grosser and Reuben 2013). Although subjects trade in fictitious
goods, they receive actual money pay-offs and thus face incentives similar to buyers
and sellers in actual markets. Furthermore, the question of tax incidence (without tax
evasion) has been widely studied in the laboratory setting (e.g., Riedl and Tyran 2005;
Ruﬄe 2005; Cox et al. 2018; Grosser and Reuben 2013) and shown to lead to results
that reflect theoretical predictions very well.
In order to make the tax evasion decision as realistic as possible we used actual tax
terminology and announced to the participants that all tax revenue would be donated to
the German Red Cross, a non-ideological charity organization that is usually perceived
as reliable and transparent.37 Additionally, although evasion may occur among buyers as
well, the real-world problem seems to be more relevant among sellers; sellers are usually
responsible for remitting sales taxes to the government. In this sense, our laboratory
setting mimics the operation of most transaction taxes in the real world. Importantly,
while our audit rate of 10% seems low, there is evidence of “real-world” tax systems with
significantly lower audit rates. For example, a recent news article revealed that the tax
agency in the state of Mississippi “audited just 2 percent of businesses operating in the
state [in fiscal year 2012].”38 While this does not necessarily imply that each firm faced
an audit rate of 2%, it does suggest that our audit rate of 10% is not unreasonable.
6 Conclusion
We use data generated in an economic laboratory experiment to identify the effect of
tax evasion among sellers on consumption prices and traded quantities. We find strong
evidence that tax-evasion opportunities cause lower prices and higher numbers of traded
units. The simple rationale behind these findings is that the evasion opportunity allows
firms to reduce their tax liability and therefore offer goods at lower prices. We additionally
36he generalizability of lab experiments is discussed by Falk and Heckman (2009). We restate some of
their arguments here and translate them to our specific context.
37Tax morale research (Torgler 2007) finds that taxpayers are more likely to comply with tax laws if
they believe that the tax revenue is spent transparently. Eckel and Grossman (1996) show that dictators
share more in dictator games if the recipient is the American Red Cross. Overall, we donated EUR 332
to the Red Cross (including the additional treatment).
38The article was published on the website of WTVA news: http://www.wtva.com/mostpopular/
story/Sales-tax-dodging-on-the-rise-in-Mississippi/dg14bG-Prk60APNSt96RHQ.cspx.
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find that sellers increase their after-tax incomes through the evasion opportunity, despite
lower prices at which they trade their goods in the presence of evasion access.
Our findings further reveal interesting results about the incidence of taxes with and
without evasion possibilities. In particular, relative to the baseline case where buyers
face ≈50% of the nominal tax burden, buyers in the treatment group only face approx-
imately 26% of the nominal tax burden. Although buyers pay lower prices than they
otherwise would, we find that sellers fully shift the expected effective tax onto buyers.
An additional treatment show that prices are different between markets with and without
evasion opportunity even if the effective tax burden is the same. In other words, endoge-
nous evasion-induced changes in the effective tax burden have different price effects than
exogenous changes in the effective tax burden of equal magnitude. This finding suggests
that the full shifting of the effective tax burden observed in the evasion treatment is due
to the evasion opportunity itself rather than the evasion-induced lower effective tax rate.
One possible explanation for this finding is that evaders desire to be compensated for the
risk of evasion and therefore trade at higher prices.
These results potentially have implications for the effects of recent policies aiming
at the reduction of tax evasion and tax avoidance.39 In particular, our findings suggest
that such policies can increase prices and lower sold quantities. While we show that
tax-evasion opportunities affect prices and quantities, we acknowledge that it is not clear
that the magnitude of the effects is the same across all types of taxes and/or 100%
comparable to cases with avoidance possibilities. Conditional on the ease with which
taxes can be evaded/avoided, it is also possible that the mechanism of evasion/avoidance
matters. For example, Tran and Nguyen (2014) show that Vietnamese firms evade VAT
by artificially increasing their sales and material costs, which is facilitated by colluding
with other producers in the supply chain. The presence of collusion as a means of evasion
suggests lower competitive pressure, which may lead to different incidence outcomes under
a VAT compared to retail sales taxes where collusion among firms is not necessary for
evasion. Given recent calls for the adoption of VAT in the USA, we argue that this
potential difference is worth investigating in future research. More generally, it would be
interesting to know if and how evasion mechanisms in different tax systems affect prices
and sold quantities.
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Tables and Figures
Tables
Table 1: Demand and Supply Schedules
Buyer Seller
Subject Value 1 Value 2 Subject Cost 1 Cost 2
1 82 52 1 18 48
2 77 72 2 23 28
3 67 37 3 33 63
4 62 42 4 38 58
5 57 47 5 43 53
Notes: Reported are demand and supply schedules.
Table 2: Summary statistics of Demographic Variables
Gender Age German Tax Morale Econ Compliance
Control Group (Non-Evaders)
Mean 0.43 24.90 0.72 0.25 0.43 –
St. Dev. 0.50 6.87 0.46 0.44 0.50 –
N. of Subjects 40 40 39 40 40 –
Treatment Group (Evaders)
Mean 0.60 26.93 0.83 0.23 0.53 0.07
St. Dev. 0.50 12.25 0.38 0.42 0.51 0.23
N. of Subjects 40 40 40 40 40 40
P-value 0.12 0.23 0.26 0.79 0.37 –
Notes: Reported are the mean characteristics of treatment and control groups. Gender is a dummy that is equal to 1 if
male, German is a dummy that is equal to 1 if native language is German, tax morale is a dummy that is equal to 1 for
subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be justified and Econ is a dummy that is equal to 1 if field of study is
economics. One subject in the control group did not report his/her language. P-value is for the Wilcoxon rank-sum test;
null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the characteristics between the two groups.
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Table 3: Prices and Quantities by Treatment Group
Price Units sold
Group Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Full Sample
Non-evader 54.99 54.86 1.57 6.04 0.14
Evader 51.24 50.87 1.52 6.55 0.26
Panel B: Period>14
Non-evader 54.36 54.07 1.15 5.96 0.19
Evader 51.65 51.27 1.26 6.49 0.30
P-value 0.057 0.029 – 0.029 –
Notes: Reported is the market-level mean and market-level median of P , where P is the price at which each unit is sold
in a given market period (see definition in the first paragraph of section 4.1). Units sold is the market-level mean of units
sold in a given market period. All numbers and statistics are based on eight independent market-level observations. Panel
A uses all completed contracts from periods 1 to 27 and panel B uses all completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. P-value
is for the exact Wilcoxon ranksum test based on eight independent market-level observations; null hypothesis is that there
is no difference between the two groups.
32
Table 4: Impact of treatment on mean market price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Full Sample
Treat -3.750*** -3.750*** -4.300*** -4.300***
(1.009) (1.077) (0.347) (0.371)
Constant 55.008*** 54.181*** 48.868*** 48.040***
(0.727) (1.247) (2.632) (3.407)
R2 0.499 0.517 0.737 0.754
N 216 216 216 216
Panel B: Period>14
Treat -2.701*** -2.701*** -2.651*** -2.651***
(0.795) (0.847) (0.075) (0.081)
Constant 54.362*** 54.297*** 49.508*** 49.443***
(0.539) (0.516) (0.572) (0.750)
R2 0.553 0.563 0.884 0.894
N 104 104 104 104
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the market level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (7) with the dependent variable defined as mean
market price in a given market period. Panel A uses all completed contracts from periods 1 to 27, panel B uses all completed
contracts in periods 15 to 27. Period FE is period fixed effects. Control variables include the share of males, share of native
German speakers, share of subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be justified, and share of subjects whose field
of study is economics. These shares are calculated at the market-level.
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Table 5: Impact of treatment on median and ask market price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Median Ask Price (P50)
Treat -2.087*** -2.087*** -1.589*** -1.589***
(0.625) (0.665) (0.218) (0.233)
Constant 53.779*** 53.918*** 60.175*** 60.314***
(0.089) (0.222) (1.655) (1.809)
R2 0.538 0.563 0.853 0.878
N 104 104 104 104
Panel B: Ask Price (P)
Treat -2.720*** -2.721*** -2.662*** -2.660***
(0.798) (0.808) (0.065) (0.069)
Constant 54.354*** 54.255*** 49.500*** 49.481***
(0.543) (0.486) (0.491) (0.593)
R2 0.173 0.176 0.276 0.279
N 644 644 644 644
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the market level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (7) with the dependent variable defined as
median market price in a given market period in panel A; and the market price for each good in each market period in
Panel B. All panels use completed contracts from periods 15 to 27. Period FE is period fixed effects. Control variables
include the share of males, share of native German speakers, share of subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be
justified, and share of subjects whose field of study is economics. These shares are calculated at the market-level.
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Table 6: Impact of treatment on units sold
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Full Sample
Treat 0.336*** 0.334*** 0.320*** 0.324***
(0.064) (0.068) (0.027) (0.035)
Constant 6.088*** 6.525*** 6.701*** 7.186***
(0.059) (0.144) (0.406) (0.277)
R2 0.090 0.292 0.100 0.301
N 1,006 1,006 1,006 1,006
Panel B: Period>14
Treat 0.402*** 0.403*** 0.598*** 0.594***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.051) (0.056)
Constant 5.939*** 6.177*** 7.891*** 8.102***
(0.118) (0.323) (0.756) (0.878)
R2 0.148 0.262 0.191 0.303
N 476 476 476 476
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the market level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (7) with the dependent variable defined as the
number of units sold in a given market period. Panel A uses all completed contracts from periods 1 to 27, panel B uses
all completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. “Period FE” is period fixed effects. Control variables include the share of
males, share of native German speakers, share of subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be justified, and share
of subjects whose field of study is economics. These shares are calculated at the market-level.
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Table 7: Overview of Results and Economic Incidence of Per-unit Tax
Incidence
Condition Price Units Nominal Tax
No-Tax 49.04 7.03 –
Control 54.36 5.96 53.2%
Treatment 51.65 6.50 26.1%
Treat Effect -2.71 0.54 -27.1
Notes: The results in “No Tax” row are from Grosser and Reuben (2013) who use
identical supply and demand schedules in an experimental double auction without
taxes. “Control” and “Treatment” refer to the groups without and with evasion op-
portunity, respectively. Reported are the mean prices and number of units traded.
”Incidence Nominal Tax” is the share of the nominal tax rate (10 ECU) that is
shifted onto buyers. “Treat Effect” indicates the non-parametric treatment effect
defined as the difference between treatment and control group. All numbers ex-
pressed in Experimental Currency Units.
Table 8: Additional Treatment and Incidence of Effective Tax Rate
Incidence
Condition Price Units Effective Tax
No-Tax 49.04 7.03 –
Control 54.36 5.96 53.2%
Treatment 51.65 6.50 101.95%
Tax Credit 50.09 6.89 42.0%
Notes: The results in “No Tax” row are from Grosser and Reuben (2013) who use
identical supply and demand schedules in an experimental double auction without
taxes. “Control” and “Treatment” refer to the groups without and with evasion
opportunity, respectively. ”Tax Credit” refers to the additional treatment without
evasion opportunity and a tax credit of 7.5 ECU. Reported are the mean prices and
number of units traded. ”Incidence Effective Tax” is the share of the effective tax
rate (10 ECU in Control, 2.56 ECU in Treatment, 2.5 ECU in Tax Credit) that is
shifted onto buyers. All numbers expressed in Experimental Currency Units.
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Figures
Figure 1: Supply and Demand Schedule
Note: The figure is adapted from Grosser and Reuben (2013, page 42, Figure 1). It shows
the demand schedule for buyers and the supply schedule for sellers with and without the
per unit tax. The predicted equilibrium occurs where the curves intersect: quantity q = 7
and price p between 48 and 52 without tax and quantity q = 6 and price p between 53
and 57 with the ECU 10 per unit tax.
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Figure 2: Economic incidence of tax on seller
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Notes: The imposition of a per-unit tax would ordinarily cause the supply curve to shift to the left and the market
equilibrium to move from point (P ∗, Q∗) to (Pc, Q1) as illustrated in panel A. Because sellers are able to evade the tax,
the supply curve shifts by a smaller amount causing the equilibrium to move from (P ∗, Q∗) to (P
′
c , Q
′
1) as illustrated in
panel B, where P
′
c < Pc.
38
Figure 3: Average market price by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the average market price P in each period for the treatment and control groups. The vertical line
indicates period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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Figure 4: Median market price by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the median market price P50 in each period for the treatment and control groups.The vertical line
indicates period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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Figure 5: Units sold by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the number of units sold in each period for the treatment and control groups.The vertical line indicates
period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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Figure 6: Additional treatment: Average market price by period and treatment
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Notes: Reported is the average market price P in each period for the treatment group, control group and the additonal
treatments. The vertical line indicates period 14; empirical results are based on market periods 15 to 27.
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Appendices
A Tables
Table 9: Impact of treatment on market price and sales: adjustment for small number of
clusters
Price
SalesMean Median Ask
Treat -2.701** -2.087*** -3.077** 0.538**
(1.123) (0.743) (1.398) (0.232)
Constant 54.362*** 53.779*** 54.769*** 5.923***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-Squared 0.553 0.538 0.162 0.234
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the market level and corrected for the small number
of clusters using the wild-bootstrap-t procedure described in Cameron et al. (2008). The correction is implemented using
Stata code provided by Judson Caskey and is available here: https://sites.google.com/site/judsoncaskey/data. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns use completed contracts from periods 15 to 27,
and number of observations is 104.
43
Table 10: Impact of treatment on market price
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ask Price Mean Ask Price Median Ask Price
Treat -2.662*** -2.660*** -2.651*** -2.651*** -1.589*** -1.589***
(0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.081) (0.218) (0.233)
Age -0.367*** -0.370*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.641*** -0.641***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.059) (0.064)
Gender -21.352*** -21.389*** -21.435*** -21.435*** -17.990*** -17.990***
(0.177) (0.174) (0.219) (0.234) (0.633) (0.676)
German 29.607*** 29.642*** 29.663*** 29.663*** 22.833*** 22.833***
(0.347) (0.329) (0.410) (0.438) (1.186) (1.267)
Tax Morale -1.274*** -1.258*** -1.245*** -1.245*** -0.921 -0.921
(0.219) (0.222) (0.254) (0.271) (0.735) (0.786)
Economics 5.126*** 5.141*** 5.156*** 5.156*** 2.562*** 2.562***
(0.153) (0.162) (0.183) (0.195) (0.529) (0.565)
Constant 49.500*** 49.481*** 49.508*** 49.443*** 60.175*** 60.314***
(0.491) (0.593) (0.572) (0.750) (1.655) (1.809)
R2 0.276 0.279 0.884 0.894 0.853 0.878
N 644 644 104 104 104 104
Period FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the market level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (7) with the dependent variable defined as the
market price for each good in each market period in Models 1 and 2; mean market price in a given market period in Models
3 and 4; and median market price in a given market period in Models 5 and 6. All panels use completed contracts from
periods 15 to 27. Period FE is period fixed effects. Gender is the share of males, German is the share of native German
speakers, tax morale is the share of subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be justified, and Field of study is the
share of subjects whose field of study is economics. These shares are calculated at the market-level.
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Table 11: Impact of treatment on units sold
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Treat 0.539*** 0.540*** 0.385*** 0.383***
(0.171) (0.173) (0.131) (0.131)
Age -0.017 -0.017
(0.035) (0.035)
Gender 2.349*** 2.343***
(0.353) (0.363)
German -2.000*** -1.973***
(0.691) (0.691)
Tax Morale 0.495 0.479
(0.436) (0.448)
Economics -0.351 -0.349
(0.305) (0.305)
Constant 5.961*** 6.147*** 6.832*** 7.005***
(0.088) (0.231) (0.978) (1.064)
R2 0.235 0.315 0.352 0.433
N 644 644 644 644
Control variables No No Yes Yes
Period FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the market level are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimates are based on equation (7) with the dependent variable defined as the
number of units sold in a given market period. Estimation is based on all completed contracts in periods 15 to 27. Period
FE is period fixed effects. Gender is the share of males, German is the share of native German speakers, tax morale is the
share of subjects who believe cheating on taxes can never be justified, and Field of study is the share of subjects whose
field of study is economics. These shares are calculated at the market-level.
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B Figures
Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of average market price by treatment
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Notes: Reported is the cumulative distribution of average market price P for the treatment and control groups. Distributions
are based on data from market periods 15 to 27. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
reports a maximum difference in distributions of 0.770 with pvalue of 0.000. This implies that the null hypothesis that the
distributions are equal is rejected.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of median market price by treatment
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Notes: Reported is the cumulative distribution of median market price P50 for the treatment and control groups. Distri-
butions are based on data from market periods 15 to 27. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
functions reports a maximum difference in distributions of 0.751 with pvalue of 0.000. This implies that the null hypothesis
that the distributions are equal is rejected.
47
Figure 9: Screenshot of the Market Place
Note: Screenshot of the lab experimental double-auction market place. The screen dis-
plays the market place for a seller in the treatment group with evasion opportunity. The
seller has sold her first unit at a price of 35. The cost for the first unit was 18, yielding a
current gross-income of 17. Her second unit with cost 48 is not traded at this point. The
screen shown is translated to English, the original experiment was conducted in German.
The market place is based on Grosser and Reuben (2013).
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C Instructions
The following pages contain the translated instructions. The instructions for all groups
were identical except for slight variations. In the following, we display the instructions for
the control group and indicate the differences between groups in brackets. The original
German versions of the instructions are available from the authors upon request.
Instructions
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. From now on until the end
of the experiment, please refrain from communicating with other participants. If you do
not abide by this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment.
We kindly ask you to read the instructions thoroughly. If you have any questions after
reading the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the
instructors will come to you and answer your question in person. Your payment and your
decisions throughout the experiment will be treated confidentially.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your decisions
and the decisions of other participants. During the experiment, your payments will be
calculated in a virtual currency: Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 30 ECU corre-
spond to 1 Euro. After the experiment, your pay-off will be converted to Euro and
given to you in cash. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
The Experiment
Roles
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will randomly assign five participants
to the role of ”sellers” and five other participants to the role of ”buyers”. Therefore,
you will either be a buyer or a seller. Your role as seller or buyer will remain the same
throughout the experiment. You will only know your own role and not the roles of other
participants.
Overview
[Control Group:
The experiment consists of 3 practice rounds and 27 paying rounds. At the beginning of
each round, all buyers and sellers trade a fictitious good in a market place. As a buyer,
you can buy units of the fictitious good and as a seller you can sell units. You can earn
ECU in the market place and your earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions
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of the other participants. Each unit sold will be subject to a per unit tax of 10 ECU
for sellers. The tax rate is the same for all sellers and is due at the end of every third
round. Details on the market place will be explained further below. All tax revenues
paid by you and all other participants will be donated to the German Red Cross.
]
[Treatment Group with Evasion Opportunity:
The experiment consists of 3 practice rounds and 27 paying rounds. At the beginning
of each round, all buyers and sellers trade a fictitious good in a market place. As a
buyer, you can buy units of the fictitious good and as a seller you can sell units. You
can earn ECU in the market place and your earnings depend on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Each unit sold will be subject to a per unit tax of
10 ECU for sellers. The tax rate is the same for all sellers and is due at the end of every
third round. At the end of every third round, sellers are asked to report the number of
units that they sold in the previous three market rounds. There is a 10% chance that
the reported decision will be checked for accuracy. Details on the market place will be
explained further below. All tax revenues paid by you and all other participants will be
donated to the German Red Cross.
]
[Additional Treatment with Tax Credit:
The experiment consists of 3 practice rounds and 27 paying rounds. At the beginning of
each round, all buyers and sellers trade a fictitious good in a market place. As a buyer,
you can buy units of the fictitious good and as a seller you can sell units. You can earn
ECU in the market place and your earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions
of the other participants. Each unit sold will be subject to a per unit tax of 10 ECU
for sellers. Sellers additionally receive a tax credit of 7.50 ECU for each unit sold. The
tax rate is the same for all sellers and is due at the end of every third round. Details on
the market place will be explained further below. All tax revenues paid by you and all
other participants will be donated to the German Red Cross.
]
The Market Place
Basics
The market place is opened for two minutes at the beginning of each round. All buyers
and sellers trade a fictitious good. In each market period, each seller can sell two units
of the fictitious good and each buyer can buy two units of the good.
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Units, costs, and values
If you are a seller, you will be given the costs for two units of a fictitious good at the
beginning of the experiment. These units shall be denoted ”Unit 1” and ”Unit 2”, where
Unit 1 costs less than Unit 2. The cost of these units to you is the same in all rounds.
However, the cost of each seller’s units will differ from the cost of other sellers’ units.
Each seller only knows her own costs.
If you are a buyer, you will be given the values for two units of a fictitious good at
the beginning of the experiment. These units shall be denoted ”Unit 1” and ”Unit 2”
where Unit 1 values more than Unit 2. The value of these units to you is the same in
all rounds. However, the value of each buyer’s units will differ from the value of other
buyers’ units. Each buyer only knows her own values.
Asks, Bids, and Transactions
Sellers can make ”asks” and Buyers can make ”bids” during the trading period. All asks
and bids are visible to everyone through the screen that appears during the two minutes
of trading. This screen will also state your type (Seller or Buyer), the time left in the
trading period and the costs or values that you were assigned for each Unit. Each Seller
can first sell Unit 1 and afterward Unit 2. Accordingly, Buyers can first buy Unit 1 and
then Unit 2.
Sellers cannot sell goods at prices lower than the assigned cost for the respective Unit.
Buyers cannot buy at prices that exceed their assigned value for the respective Unit.
Sellers can make asks at any time during the trading period but each ask has to be lower
than the current lowest ask on the market. Similarly, Buyers can always propose bids as
long as they are larger than the current largest bid on the market.
To realize a transaction, Sellers can either accept a bid or buyers can accept an ask.
The transaction price for the unit will then be equal to the accepted ask or bid.
(Gross) Earnings in the Market Place
Units that are not traded do not yield any earnings. Gross earnings for each Unit are as
follows:
For Sellers:
Gross Earnings from selling Unit 1 = transaction price of Unit 1 - cost of Unit 1
Gross Earnings from selling Unit 2 = transaction price of Unit 2 - cost of Unit 2
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For Buyers:
Gross Earnings from buying Unit 1 = value of Unit 1 - transaction price of Unit 1
Gross Earnings from buying Unit 2 = value of Unit 2 - transaction price of Unit 2
Screenshots from trading market
Sellers:
Here Screenshot Sellers
Sellers can accept a current bid by pressing ”Sell at this Price”. To make a new ask,
Sellers have to enter their ask price into the field to the right of the ”Make a smaller ask”
button and press the button to submit the ask.
Buyers:
Here Screenshot Buyers
Buyers can accept the current ask by pressing ”Buy at this Price”. To make a new bid,
Buyers have to enter their bid into the field to the right of the ”Make a smaller bid” and
press the button to submit the bid.
[Added in the treatment group with evasion opportunity:
The Reporting Decision for Sellers
After three consecutive trading periods, you will be shown the number of units traded
over the three previous trading rounds and the respective gross earnings on those units.
For each unit traded in the three previous periods, a per-unit tax of 10 ECU is due
for sellers.
Sellers will then be asked to report the number of units sold in the previous three rounds
for tax purposes. The reported amount may be between zero and the total number of
units that were actually sold over the previous three rounds. After the reporting decision
is submitted by pressing the ”OK” button, the computer will determine if it is checked
whether the reported number equals the actual number of units sold over the last three
periods. The computer makes this call by randomly selecting an integer number between
1 and 10. The reporting decision will only be checked if the computer selects the number
1. Therefore, there is a random chance of 10% that the reporting decision will be checked.
]
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[Net income information in the control group:
Calculation of Net Income for Sellers
After three consecutive trading periods, the screen shows how many units of the fictitious
unit you have traded over the previous three rounds and the resulting gross income from
the previous three periods. For each unit traded in the three previous periods, a per-unit
tax of 10 ECU is due for sellers
Therefore, a seller’s payment – the net income – , consists of her sum of all gross earnings
from the three previous rounds (henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax
payment. The tax payment is the number of units sold over the previous three periods
multiplied by the tax rate of 10 ECU. Hence:
Net Income = sum gross income - (number of units sold in previous 3 rounds * per-unit
tax rate)
]
[Net income information in the treatment group with evasion opportunity:
Calculation of Net Income for Sellers
Sellers will be informed of the outcome of the random draw, and will be faced with one
of the following two scenarios:
1. Computer selects a number between 2 and 10 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10):
The reporting decision will not be checked. A seller’s earnings after taxes – the net in-
come –, in this case, consists of the sum of all her gross earnings from the three previous
periods (henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax payment. The tax pay-
ment is the reported number of units sold multiplied by the tax rate of 10 ECU. Hence:
Net income = sum gross income - (reported number of units sold * per unit tax rate)
2. Computer selects number 1:
The reporting decision will be checked. A seller’s earnings after taxes – the net income
–, in this case, consist of sum of all her gross earnings from the three previous periods
(henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax payment. The tax payment is
based on the number of units actually sold over the last three periods. If the number of
units was not reported correctly, a seller will additionally have to pay a penalty that is
equal to the amount of tax liability that was not paid. Hence:
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Net income = sum gross income - (actual number of units sold * per unit tax rate) -
(number of units not reported * per unit tax rate)
]
[Net income information in the additional treatment with tax credit:
Calculation of Net Income for Sellers
After three consecutive trading periods, the screen shows how many units of the fictitious
unit you have traded over the previous three rounds and the resulting gross income from
the previous three periods. For each unit traded in the three previous periods, a per-unit
tax of 10 ECU is due for sellers. In addition, sellers receive a tax credit of 7.5 ECU
for each unit sold.
Therefore, a seller’s payment – the net income – , consists of her sum of all gross earnings
from the three previous rounds (henceforth denoted ”sum gross income”) minus the tax
payment. The tax payment consists of the per-unit tax of 10 ECU per unit sold minus
the tax credit of 7.5 ECU per unit sold. Hence:
Tax payment
= (number of units sold * per-unit tax rate) - (number of units sold * tax credit)
= number of units sold * (10 - 7.5)
Net income then is:
Net Income
= sum gross income - tax payment
= sum gross income - (number of units sold * (10 - 7.5) )
]
Payment
The first 3 rounds serve as practice rounds, in which you cannot earn money. The
subsequent 27 rounds are paying rounds.
Buyers do not pay taxes so that gross earnings equal net earnings. A buyer’s payoff
hence equals the sum of gross earnings from all 27 trading periods.
Sellers receive a payoff that consists of the sum of all net incomes, each of which is
earned after every third paying round (i.e., after paying rounds 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24,
27.)
You will be paid the payoff in cash at the end of the experiment. Additionally, each
54
participant receives a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. If the sum of all gross or net incomes is
negative or zero, you will be paid the show-up fee; that is, you cannot make losses and
will earn a minimum amount of 2.50 Euro.
Final Remarks
After the completion of all 30 rounds – 3 practice round plus 27 paying rounds – the
experiment is finished. You will be asked to complete a short questionnaire at the end
of the experiment while we prepare the payments. All information collected through
this questionnaire, just like all data gathered during the experiment, are anonymous and
exclusively used for scientific purposes. After you have completed the questionnaire,
please remain seated at your booth until we call you to come up front to pick up your
payment.
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